Patents have been shown to facilitate technology transactions. However, the reasons for the effect are unclear. Patents may assist trade in technology by either: (i) increasing information sharing during the negotiation phase through publication of technical details contained in the patent document (?disclosure effect?); or (ii) protecting buyers against the expropriation of the idea by third parties (?appropriation effect?). We test for the presence of both effects using exact matching analysis on a novel dataset of 860 technology transaction negotiations. We find evidence for the appropriation but not the disclosure effect. Technology transaction negotiations involving a granted patent instead of a pending patent (our test for the appropriation effect) are significantly more likely to be successfully completed, particularly in technology fields where patent protection is known to be more effective such as biotech, chemicals, drugs and medical.
Introduction
This paper studies the role of intellectual property (IP) rights on technology trade. Trade in technology has become a central part of today's highly-specialized and opened innovation process (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001; Chesbrough 2003) . Data from the United States (US) National Science Foundation, for example, show that the ratio of US business research and development (R&D) contracted out to external enterprises trebled between 1981 and 2007 from about two per cent to seven per cent (NSB, 2008) . Technology trade improves welfare as it allows for the emergence of specialized inventors, which increases innovation quality, speeds up development time, and enhances knowledge diffusion (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 2001; Spulber 2008) . However, as in the case of tangible goods, the realization of welfare gains from technology trade rests upon wellfunctioning markets.
Several authors have argued and provided evidence that markets for technology suffer from imperfections, often leading to transaction failures (Caves, Crookell and Killing 1983; Zeckhauser 1996; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Gans and Stern 2010; Zhang, Agrawal, and Cockburn 2013) . Imperfections include, but are not limited to, high search costs and other transaction costs, lack of market thickness, and incomplete information (and related concerns about information asymmetry such as in a market for lemons). Although the literature provides ample evidence that patents assist technology transactions (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 2001; Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley 2006; Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2008) , there is still a need for a better understanding of how patents help innovative firms and technology traders in overcoming frictions in the market for technology. There is little empirical evidence that can explain the mechanisms through which patents facilitate technology trade.
In this paper, we empirically test two possible hypotheses of why patents are helpful in the market for immature technologies. As Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008: 987) observe "...patent rights can have a significant impact on the risk of expropriation and the willingness of licensors to disclose unprotected information" (italics added). The latter part of the statement implies that patents facilitate technology trade by increasing information sharing since pending patent applications are published 18 months after the filing date. We refer to this hypothesis as the 'disclosure effect' hypothesis. On the other hand, the former part of the statement means that patents facilitate technology trade by guaranteeing the appropriability of inventions for the buyer. In this 'traditional' role of patents, possession of a valid patent may help assure the prospective buyer that his or her future profits will be protected. We refer to this hypothesis as the 'appropriation effect' hypothesis.
To the best of our knowledge, existing studies on markets for technology have not provided any formal empirical test of these hypotheses. Most studies have so far sought to provide evidence that patents matter, without seeking to disentangle the actual mechanism through which patents operate.
Yet understanding the mechanism would shed light on the causes of transaction failures and would help in proposing appropriate policy responses to market imperfections. A common weakness of the existing studies is the absence of information to predict the relevant counterfactuals for testing the two hypotheses: studies either focus only on patented technologies or on technologies that will ultimately become licensed. For example, Shane (2002) studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology's patents and finds that inventions are more likely to be licensed when patents are an effective mechanism for appropriating the returns to innovation. Similarly, studying patented technologies of Harvard University's faculty, Elfenbein (2007) finds that a patent more than doubles the likelihood of finding a license partner. Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008) obtain a similar result in their study of 200 technology licensing deals announced between 1990 and 1999. Two recent studies by Hegde and Luo (2013) and Drivas, Zhen and Wright (2013) begin to provide some insights on part of the mechanism: they find that patent disclosure accelerates the licensing of technologies by reducing search costs.
A key distinguishing feature of the present study is that it uses novel survey data of technology transaction negotiations in which not all negotiations involve a patent, and not all negotiations are successful. The setup allows us to obtain estimates of patent effects that do not suffer from the sample selection bias in existing studies that only consider patented technologies or successful outcomes. In addition, it enables us to construct appropriate counterfactuals to test for the two hypothesized roles of patents. The analysis relies on a sample of 860 immature technology transactions-sale, license, cross-license, contract research, etc.-negotiated in Australia around the 2010s. A first noteworthy finding is that 20.3 per cent of technology transaction negotiations in the sample do not involve a patent. Second, we find that the positive patent effect comes mostly from the protection of the appropriation of the technology for the buyer (and more so in technology fields where patents are effective). The evidence in support of the disclosure effect is less apparent.
Literature review and hypotheses

Existing studies
A first set of studies that are relevant to the focus of this paper offers indirect evidence of the importance of patents in markets for technology. For example, Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2001) argue that the changes in the US patent law in the nineteenth century were instrumental in the development of a market for technology. Burhop (2010) documents a well-developed market for patents in Imperial Germany. Using more recent data, Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) show that technology transfer within US multinational firms increases in response to a strengthening of intellectual property (IP) rights in host countries. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) find that an increase in the effectiveness of patent protection can increase licensing propensity. Another stream of research has surveyed the motives to patent and provides additional evidence on the importance of patents in technology transactions (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000; Blind et al. 2006; de Rassenfosse 2012) . These surveys of patenting firms typically report that between 20 and 30 per cent of respondents take patents in order to generate licensing revenues.
More direct evidence on the role of patents in technology transactions is scarcer. Drawing on data on 1,397 patents assigned to Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Shane (2002) studies among other questions, the determinants of patent licensing. He finds that inventions are more likely to be licensed when patents are an effective mechanism for appropriating the returns to innovation. Using a sample of technologies invented by faculty at Harvard University, Elfenbein (2007) studies the factors that affect the likelihood of an invention being licensed. He finds that, although a majority of technologies are licensed prior to the receipt of a patent, a patent more than doubles the likelihood of finding a license partner. Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008) study how the IP system impacts the timing of cooperation between start-up technology entrepreneurs and established firms during commercialization. Based on a sample of 200 technology licensing deals announced in 1990-1999 they find that patent allowance speeds up licensing. The grant event is associated with a 70 per cent increase in the hazard rate of licensing. Other authors have recently produced additional evidence on the effect of patents on the timing of licensing agreements. Hegde and Luo (2013) and Drivas, Zhen and Wright (2013) use the enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, which requires patent applications to be published 18 months after the priority filing date, to show that patent disclosure accelerates the licensing of technologies. Hegde and Luo (2013) take this result as evidence that patents reduce search cost in the market for ideas.
Hypotheses
Although the above studies provide evidence of the role of patents, they were not designed to explain the reason(s) for the effect. This is because their samples were limited: some studies focus on patented technologies only, while others focus only on technologies that will ultimately become licensed. As a result these studies provide limited insight on the extent to which, and the reason(s) why, patents increase the success rate of technology transactions. In a nutshell, this paper argues and verifies empirically that patent facilitates technology trade in two ways: it increases the sharing of information during the negotiation phase by disclosing technical details of the idea (disclosure effect); and it insulates the idea against third-party expropriation (appropriation effect). The first effect occurs because, by law, patent applications are made public 18 months after application. Thus, there is no reason for the seller to withhold any relevant technical information that would have become public anyway. The second effect arises because a granted patent gives its owner the right to exclude all other parties from using the ideas embodied in the patent document. Technology transaction negotiations are a classical example of bargaining under asymmetric information (Samuelson 1984) and patents can be seen as a signal that reduces information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. This informational role of patent is particularly important in light of the 'paradox of disclosure', first articulated by Arrow (1962) . If the value of a piece of knowledge is unknown to the buyer until it is disclosed to him or her, then he or she only knows its value when he or she has acquired the knowledge. Then however, he or she has no need to buy it. The seller is thus particularly reluctant to share valuable information for fear of second party expropriation. We expect that poor knowledge about the content of a purchase will dampen prospective buyers' enthusiasm. This information disclosure tradeoff, which has been well known among IP professional circles for some time, is also discussed within the academic literature. Ordover (1991) and subsequently Arora (1995) , Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2001) , Anton and Yao (2003) , Gans and Stern (2003) , Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2008) , OECD (2008) and Kani and Motohashi (2012) have all argued that patent holders can knowingly share the patent application information with the prospective buyer with the confidence that they are legally protected from second party expropriation. However, parties who seek to negotiate before the patent has been successfully examined do not have the legal protection yet have disclosed considerable information on their technology. As discussed later, we exploit this distinction between technologies with patent pending and those that had never filed for a patent to identify the disclosure effect of patent. Because inventions are typically non-excludable (or at least weakly excludable), buyers may rely on patent protection to ensure exclusive use of their inventions. Traditionally, the patent system ensures excludability by granting the owner of an invention the temporary monopoly right over its invention.
Disclosure Effect
Appropriation Effect
However, in practice, the effectiveness of patents in enhancing appropriation varies significantly across technology fields (Mansfield 1986; Levin et al. 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) . In particular, patent protection is more critical in more codified technologies which are easier to imitate and are more exposed to third-party expropriation (Teece 1986) . By contrast, tacit knowledge is difficult to articulate, and hence, to copy. The effect of patent protection is expected to be stronger in codified technology fields. The classic areas where codification is (near) complete are the chemical and drug-related technologies. Hence, we may expect the appropriation effect to be stronger in such fields of technology.
Data and methodology
To test the hypotheses, we perform a matching analysis to novel data on 860 negotiations to sell or license (simply, to trade) immature technology in Australia. A specific feature of this study is that the unit of analysis is a technology transaction negotiation where not all negotiations were successful and not all negotiations involved a granted (or pending) patent. This allows for a richer analysis on the effect of patent on negotiation outcome than can be done with data limited to patented technologies only. Immature technologies, in this study, refer to ideas that need further work in order to be useful or deliver final products in contrast to mature technologies that are ready-to-use. The distinction between mature and immature technologies is seldom made explicit in the literature, even though the issues at stake are quite peculiar to the degree of maturity of technologies. Most studies of markets for technology consider the trading of immature technologies (or 'embryonic' technologies, see Jensen and Thursby 2001) because it is the area where transaction frictions are the most stringent. By contrast, the market for mature (i.e. proven) technologies, at the far end of the innovation process, raises issues such as price competition which are well studied in the economics literature (see e.g.
Katz and Shapiro 1986).
Data source and sample descriptive
We collected the data by conducting a survey of Australian technology traders. We conducted 66 semi-structured interviews around Australia during 2010 in order to delineate the sampling frame.
This allowed us to identify the types of individuals and organizations that may participate in the Australian technology market. In addition, the pre-survey interviews also allowed us to identify key variables to collect from the survey. The final list of potential traders, which comprised both in-house business development managers and independent go-betweens, was surveyed in early 2011 by mail.
The sample includes 1,427 people who we believed had a hands-on role in technology transactions (we excluded managers with only supervisory or policy roles). The overall response rate was 47.0 per cent, which is high for a company-level, mail-based survey and perhaps reflects the provision of an incentive in the first mail-out (a A$50 gift voucher).
1 The response rates vary from 31.6 per cent for business angels to 65.0 per cent for public sector research organizations. While 670 people responded to the survey, 214 indicated that they had not been involved in a technology transaction with their current employer, leaving 456 people providing useable information.
In the survey, we defined a technology transaction as: "A non-commercial ready technology that is exchanged between organizations for further development. Exclude transactions between parents and subsidiaries. Exclude material transfer agreements." A successful negotiation is one where the respondent described the transaction as completed, whereas an unsuccessful transaction is one that was abandoned (that is, not completed or concluded after 12 months). To ensure a balanced dataset between successful and unsuccessful negotiations, we asked each survey participant about the last completed and the last abandoned negotiation. Importantly, asking about the last transactions (as Mansfield (1986) and Arundel and Kabla (1998) , not all pharmaceutical and chemical inventions are the subject of a patent application. The average approximated value of the transacted technology is in the AU$500,000-1,000,000 range. indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the sample means are the same between the three patent groups, at the 5-per cent probability threshold.
Methodology
Identification strategy
The gist of the identification strategy is to compare the probability of sealing a deal across groups of negotiations in which either the extent of information disclosure differs (disclosure effect) or the extent of legal protection differs (appropriation effect) but not both.
To test for the disclosure effect we compare negotiations involving technologies that had a patent pending and had thus committed to full disclosure to those involving technologies that had never been applied for patent. The logic behind this test is that while neither the pending-patent group nor the never-filed group have assured protection from expropriation of their future profits, the patentpending group has already committed to full disclosure. Parties who seek to negotiate before the patent has been successfully examined do not have the legal protection yet have disclosed considerable information on their technology. Indeed the Australian IP office estimates that considerably less than one percent of applications are withdrawn before publication. suggesting that the information disclosed even in pending patents matter.
Regardless of the reason why a patent has not been sought (early-stage research, not patentable subject matter, cost, or desire for secrecy), the owners of the technologies have a choice of how much to reveal during negotiations. It is plausible that, on average, how much they reveal is no more, but rather less, than revealed by the pending-patent group. We refer to the group of negotiations for technologies subject to a pending patent as the treatment group and to the group of negotiations for technologies which had never been the subject of a patent application as the control group. Thus, the treatment is whether the technology was associated with a pending patent and the outcome of interest is whether or not the negotiations ended with a transaction.
To test for the appropriation effect we compare negotiations over technologies that held a granted patent to those that held only a pending patent at the time of negotiation. Since, in both cases, all relevant features of the technologies are already disclosed by the corresponding patent applications, the main difference between the two is the degree of legal certainty over the negotiated technology. The patent-grant group has been granted legal protection, while the patent-pending group has been not. 3 We refer to the group of negotiations involving technologies with granted patents as the treatment group and to the group of negotiations involving technologies with pending patents as the control group. Thus, the treatment is whether the patent is granted at the start of negotiations. The outcome to be compared is whether or not the negotiating parties succeeded in reaching a deal.
Average treatment effect on the treated
We seek to estimate the effects of patents on the probability of sealing a deal. 
where i is the unit of observation (a technology transaction negotiation), PEND denotes the treatment for testing the first hypothesis (whether the technology was protected with a pending patent) and REG denotes the treatment for testing the second hypothesis (whether the patent is registered at the time of negotiations). If treatment matters as hypothesized, then the probability for the negotiation to be completed increases with treatment, that is, ATT > 0.
While the factual outcome is directly observed, the counterfactual outcome is not. Rather, we observe: .
Because we cannot be sure that the data is random with respect to selection into the treatment, we cannot simply assume that and compare the probability of completion across observed groups. If factors that cause selection into treatment also influence the outcome, then the estimate of the treatment effect will be biased. The solution adopted involves identifying a group of untreated units that match the treated units on a set of observable covariates, X, and that constitute valid counterfactuals. This technique, known as matched sampling (Cochran 1968; Rubin 1973) , leads to unbiased estimate of the ATT if all the confounding factors are captured in X (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . Once a set of counterfactuals is identified, the empirical counterpart of equation (1) is given by:
where N T is the number of treated units.
Coarsened Exact Matching
The analysis uses a matching method known as coarsened exact matching (CEM) recently introduced by Porro (2011a, 2011b) . The basic idea behind CEM is to coarsen each continuous variable so that substantively indistinguishable values are grouped and assigned the same numerical value; then, exact-matching algorithm is applied to each strata within the coarsened data to identify the control group; finally, the coarsened data are discarded and the original (uncoarsened) values of the matched data are retained. 4 Iacus, King and Porro (2011a, 2011b) and Blackwell et al. (2009) discuss the various desirable properties of CEM as a matching method. The method is particularly attractive for the present study given the nature of the data in which all observed matching covariates are discrete as described below.
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The relevant matching covariates are those that determine both treatment assignment and outcome but are not affected by treatment assignment. The latter condition is straightforward to satisfy because we observe technological characteristics that do not change easily such as commercial-readiness, technological area, technical feasibility inter alia. For the former condition, we observe characteristics of the transacted technology that we expect to be correlated with the decision to apply for patent and/or the grant of the application and the outcome of the negotiation. In the disclosure effect test this means controlling for factors that affect both the seller's decision to file for a patent and the negotiation outcome. Regarding the test for the appropriation effect, this means factors that might cause parties to want to enter negotiations earlier rather than later (that is, before a patent is issued) and that also affect negotiation outcome. Anecdotally, we know that some parties seek to negotiate before the patent has been granted while others wait until the legal uncertainty has been resolved (see also Elfenbein 2007; Gans, Hsu and Stern 2008) . While a priori the reasons for assignment in each case differ, in practice there is a common core of logical covariates to use.
A first covariate that could affect both negotiation outcome and patent status is the degree of feasibility of the technology (one dimension of the quality of a technology). Sellers with more technically risky ideas could negotiate early in the patent lifecycle or decide to not apply for patent. 4 We use a user written Stata's package "cem" to implement the matching (Blackwell et al. 2009 ). 5 In fact, since most matching covariates are dummies and there is no grouping of the dummy values, the CEM matching method we use is essentially an exact matching method. This means that once the matching are done and balance is achieved, equation (2) can be used directly to estimate the ATT of interest without any further regression analysis required (Blackwell et al. 2009 shown that the propensity to patent varies across technology fields (Arundel and Kabla 1998; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000) . Furthermore, it is plausible that both how early negotiations commence in the patent application process and the probability of reaching successful negotiations are influenced by the invention's technology area. For example, people working in faster moving technologies may prefer to enter negotiations well before examination, and these technologies may also have systematically higher (or lower) negotiation success rates.
Finally, we include the market orientation of the organizations involved. The modus operandi of private-sector firms, compared to universities, public research organizations and government agencies, is likely to differ with respect to when to start negotiations or whether to apply for a patent.
Each of these matching covariates is defined and summarized in Table 1 presented earlier.
Limitation of the methodology and validity tests
A limitation of the matching method is its implied assumption that all relevant confounding factors are measured in the dataset (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004) . Although one cannot test for the presence of non-random selection into treatment, one can conduct tests for the sensitivity of results to differing levels of unobserved heterogeneity. We use the bounding approach first proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) and codified by Becker and Caliendo (2007) . The test asks how much hidden bias can be present before the qualitative conclusions of the study begin to change. Thus, this test does not 'prove' the unconfoundedness assumption inherent in the matching method but rather determines how biased an unmeasured variable must be to render the coefficient of the treatment variable insignificant.
After presenting the headline results, we test the robustness of the disclosure hypothesis by limiting the sample in two ways. First, we exclude negotiations that did not include any on-going inventor participation as these negotiations should be affected more by the ex-ante disclosure effect.
Secondly, we exclude technologies that are not patentable subject matter, or are very early-stage or are only protected by copyright, since these features may affect both the decision to file for a patent and negotiation success.
To assess the robustness of the estimated appropriation effect, we limit the sample in two ways:
only those contracts with an exclusivity clause; and only technologies in the codified areas of biotech, chemicals, drugs and medical (keeping the matching covariates the same). We expect that the appropriation effect will be larger for these sub-samples because either the need to legally exclude all others has been reported by the buyer as being highly important or because of the highly codified nature of the technology.
Results
Test of disclosure effect
The test for the disclosure effect of patent involves computing the average difference between completion rate of negotiations of technology with pending patent (the treatment group) and completion rate of negotiations of technology involving no patent (the control group). Table 2 presents the matching results and the estimated disclosure effect. The Mean Standardized Bias (MSB)
is zero in all but the 'excluding on-going inventor' sample (where it is acceptably low). This result indicates that exact matching on observable covariates has been achieved.
The headline ATT result for the various scenarios shows that in no instance is disclosure statistically significant. Accordingly, there is no empirical evidence to support hypothesis 1. 6 BeckerCaliendo test (not reported) suggests that holding a pending patent will show a positive effect if there are unobserved factors that negatively impact on patent pending status but positively affect negotiation success at gamma equals 1.5 (at the 5% level). This figure means that the conclusion of no disclosure effect would not be altered if the matching of both groups had failed to control for an unobserved characteristic strongly related to negotiation success and 50 per cent more common amongst pending-patent negotiations. One risk associated with the operationalization of the test for the disclosure effect is that the buyer may also see the technologies in the patent-pending group as more appropriable than in the nopatent group because the chance is high that patent-pending technologies will eventually be granted patent protection. Hence, this approach potentially biases the disclosure effect upwardly, so that a conclusion of 'no effect' is stronger We can thus confidently say that there is no evidence of disclosure effect on the negotiation outcomes once the two parties started negotiation. Table 3 summarizes the matching results and the estimated appropriation effect. In this case, the treatment group consists of negotiations for technologies protected by a registered patent and the control group consists of negotiations for technologies which only have a pending patent. As in the disclosure effect test, the exact matching pre-processing produces a 'perfectly' matched sample of treatment and control groups except for the sub-sample with exclusivity clauses (where it is acceptably low). Based on the matched sample, the estimated appropriation effect (ATT) is 9.4 7 It is also possible, but unlikely, that a seller filed during negotiations and the respondent claimed that this was a 'no patent filed' type of negotiation. We asked a follow up question about why sellers did not file: 39 per cent said technology not patentable subject matter; 22 per cent said early stage technology; and 12 per cent said owner did not want to disclose. Given these sort of responses, we believe the respondent to the questionnaire would have classified a seller as patent pending or patent grant if a patent was filed part way through the negotiation process.
Test of appropriation effect
percentage points and is statistically significant. The grant effect rises to 16.6 percentage points with the strata-by-strata estimate. When the sample is restricted either to negotiations requiring an exclusivity clause or to technology areas in which patent is considered as more effective (biotech, chemicals, drugs & medical) , the appropriation effect is larger than the full sample estimate. BeckerCaliendo test (not reported) suggests that the result still holds if there are unobserved confounding factors at gamma equals 1.2 that positively affect both assignment to patent status and negotiation success (at the 5 per cent level). In other words, the conclusion can tolerate an unobserved covariate that would affect both treatment assignment and outcome, and that would be up to 20 per cent more prevalent in the treatment group. 'Average Treatment effect on the Treated'. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard error for the strata-by-strata estimate obtained using equal weight for each strata. *,**,***: p < .10, .05, .01 (two-tailed).
The fact that we observe patent status at the start of negotiations only may lead to a conservative estimate of the appropriation effect. If a transaction classified as patent pending at the time of negotiations had in fact a patent granted before the contract was signed, then we will have overstated the effect of a patent pending and thus underestimated the net effect of granted patents.
Alternative interpretations and limitations
Taken together, the results presented above confirm that patents facilitate trade of technology and suggest that the reason is mostly because they ensure the appropriation of the technology. This view is consistent with the strong result for the appropriation effect obtained on the subsample of biotech, chemicals, drugs & medical technologies, for which we know that patents are effective for protecting against imitation. However, there are alternative interpretations and limitations of the methodology that warrant further discussion.
With respect to the interpretation of the results, we do not know for sure whether the legal title acts by clarifying the border between ideas or the border between users. While we have coined the discussion in terms of establishing a clear demarcation about who can and cannot use the technology, it is possible that the legal title works primarily, or also, by clearing up any fuzzy idea boundaries (see Bessen and Meurer 2008) . Both factors are interrelated as without a clear delineation of idea boundaries it is difficult to prove trespass. Two factors however speak against the latter explanation.
First, to the extent that the codified technologies have innately clear boundaries, the observation that a granted legal title has a larger effect in the highly codified technologies suggests that the legal title operates to establish who can and cannot use a technology. Second, we observe from the data that inclusion of an exclusivity clause in the proposed contract has a significant effect on negotiation success. This observation implies that the right to exclude other users has value to many buyers.
It is also possible that the legal title operates merely as a signal of the value of the technology.
Although patent offices do not assess patentability on the basis of technological value, but rather novelty and non-obviousness, buyers could still be more willing to commit when the technology they are buying is certified by a trusted agent such as the patent office. However, given that the effect is greater in fields where patent protection is known to more be effective for appropriation, we believe that a granted legal title offers more than just a signal of technological value. 8 Finally, the results do not imply that invention disclosure through the patent document is an irrelevant dimension in markets for technology. The analysis presented in this paper considers the success of negotiations once parties have met. It suggests that disclosure through the patent document does not increase the chance of success during negotiation. However, previous research has shown that invention disclosure through the patent document increases the chance that parties meet. For example, Hedge and Luo (2013) provide evidence that patent publications are an effective form of advertising for would-be licensors (see also Hellmann 2007 ).
There are a number of limitations to our work. First, as with any matched sample analysis, the validity of the results rests on the relevance of the matching covariates. We have applied the most stringent matching method, namely coarsened exact matching, and have reduced the observable global imbalance between treatment and control groups to essentially zero. We have matched on a dimension of quality in an effort to capture quality variation as best as possible. In order to alleviate remaining concerns related to the confounding effect of quality, we should point out that we did notfind evidence of a market for lemons in our semi-structured interviews. A series of robustness tests (not reported) in the form of different matching variables (splitting the codified technology groups into: biotech; chemicals; and drugs and medical; using the type of contract; using a proxy measure for trust between parties; and controlling for whether the respondent was representing the seller or buyer) do not change the initial findings. We have discussed how matching is based on observables and does not eliminate endogenous selection due to unobservables. Yet we believe that in all reasonable scenarios, not being able to control for unobservables, such as the expectation that a pending patent will be granted, implies that our estimated treatment effect will overestimate the disclosure effect. 9 We have also conducted some sensitivity tests of how much countervailing unobservable factors can co-exist with the findings.
Second, the present analysis is probably as close as one has been to a natural experiment design and we are aware of no other studies that explicitly address the issues raised in this paper. A special effort was dedicated to collecting novel survey data on technology transaction negotiations. Survey design involves a trade-off between breadth (in terms of response rate) and depth (in terms of quantity of information collected per respondent). A desire to strike the right balance between these two dimensions has precluded us from collecting the publication number of the patent documents associated with the transaction. As a result, it is not possible to link our survey data to patent databases. We see this as a minor concern since this issue has been dealt with elsewhere. Indeed, the vast majority of studies on licensing has focused on patent-related deals and has analyzed patent-level characteristics. The present work deliberately moves away from this trend.
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Third, a note regarding the generalizability of the findings. Australia is a small open economy with an English-speaking population and a common law tradition whose geographically closest (though distant) technology trading partner is the United States. OECD data reveal that Australia technology receipts from (and payments to) the United States account for about half Australia's OECD receipts (payments) (OECD 2013) . Given this, we see no reason why results would be of a different nature in the United States or in any other knowledge-intensive nation.
Conclusion
Previous research has established that markets for technology are imperfect and has shown that patents facilitate technology transactions. The present paper explores the reasons for the effect. Theresults show that patent-pending and never-filed inventions are licensed at a similar rate, which is lower than the rate at which patented inventions are licensed after matching on feasibility, industry and other relevant covariates. We take these results as evidence that: i) patents aide the transfer of technology by strengthening appropriation; and ii) disclosure of the idea through the patent document does not increase negotiation success.
In our opinion, the lack of a 'disclosure effect' in the data implies that other non-patent mechanisms are being used to protect against second-party expropriation. Disclosure still matters, but patents are not superior to other means of enhancing disclosure or that the information contained in the patent document is of limited value such that it does not greatly reduce information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. Technology brokers often claim that confidentiality agreements, to bind prospective buyers to not use the disclosed knowledge, can be an alternative to patents. It is difficult to get hard data on the extent to which confidentiality agreements are used in transacting technology.
Whereas some legal practitioners report that non-disclosure agreements are systematically used (even when patents are taken), others report that prospective R&D-active buyers will not sign these agreements. In summary then, our results do not support the idea that patents are a cure for the "paradox of disclosure". While this paradox is appealing from a theoretical point of view, its practical validity appears to be more limited. This paper deepens our understanding of success factors in technology transactions. Results indicate that patents are used as legal documents to ensure appropriability of the invention and, more generally, that weak appropriability can be a deal breaker. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that the appropriation effect is greater in fields where patent protection is more effective. A practical implication of our results relates to the derived demand for patents. While protection from third-party expropriation ultimately concerns buyers, the decision to apply for a patent essentially rests on the owner (i.e., seller), putting him or her at risk of myopia. When considering whether to protect the technology with a patent, the seller should also factor in that a granted patent is likely to increase the probability of negotiation success, ceteris paribus. Another implication relates to the timing of negotiation. The data show that prospective sellers significantly increase their chance of success if they come to the negotiation table with a granted patent instead of a pending patent.
Finally, many observers of the patent system report considerable backlogs and lengthy grant delays in major patent offices. The results imply that these delays will slow down the pace of -or prevent -technology transfers. This issue is particularly problematic for start-ups and SMEs that are less able to sustain regulatory delays. In this context, the recent implementation of a fast-track option at the USPTO, whereby a patent application enjoys an expedited review in exchange of an additional fee, is particularly welcome. The results also underline the importance of high-quality patent systems.
Prospective buyers do care about the threat of third-party expropriation, and a high quality examination is likely to increase buyers' confidence that their future profits will be protected. Thus, a high-quality patent system helps support a proper functioning of markets for technology.
